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Abstract
25
The maintenance of cooperation is difficult whenever collective action problems are 26 vulnerable to freeriding (reaping the benefits without contributing to the maintenance of the 27 good). We identify a novel factor that can make a system tolerate an extent of freeriding. If a 28 population consists of discrete types with demographically distinct roles, such that the success 29 of one type does not imply it can spread to replace other types in the population, then 30 collective goods may persist in the presence of free-riders because they are necessarily kept 31 in a minority role. Biased sex ratios (e.g. in haplodiploids) create conditions where individuals 32 of one sex are a minority. We show that this can make the less common sex contribute less to 33 a public good in a setting where the relevant life-history stage -larval group defence against 34 predators -does not feature any current breeding opportunities that might lead to 35 confounding reasons behind sex-specific behaviour. We test our model with haplodiploid pine 36 sawfly larvae, showing that female larvae are the main contributors to building the 37 antipredator defence against predators. Significance statement 50 Individuals in groups can cooperate to achieve something together, but with an evolutionary 51 difficulty: if benefits of cooperation are shared equally among all, freeriders get the same 52 benefit as others while paying less for it. We propose a novel reason why freeriding does not 53 automatically spread until the collectively beneficial outcome is destroyed: sometimes groups 54
Introduction even if freeriding becomes fixed in this population, as m-individuals never form large enough 100 proportion of groups to alone cause the collapse of the good. This intuition is confirmed by 101 mathematical analysis (Fig. 1) . 102 We next proceed beyond the toy model, as real biological groups are rarely formed of two 103 reproductively isolated types. (Mutualisms are an example, but they differ from our context 104 because the two species involved typically do not contribute different quantities of the same 105
resource -e.g. in rhizobia-plant mutualisms, plants do not contribute to nitrogen-fixing but 106 instead offer other resources.) One context where conspecifics may consist of distinct 107 categories, with the possibility of one being in a minority, is that of two sexes, with the 108 potential for sex-specific selection to contribute to a task that could be performed by either 109 sex in principle. In the context of avian cooperative breeding, there is support for the idea that 110 adult sex ratio biases (which can arise through differential mortality and thus do not require 111 primary sex ratio biases) can make the majority sex adopt the helper role (7). Here, difficulties 112 in mate finding by the surplus sex play a considerable role in the relative profitability of 113 philopatric helping as an alternative to independent breeding (see (8) for a related idea where 114 sex ratios also evolve -the helper repayment hypothesis). In arthropods, selection to 115 overproduce the more helpful sex can lead to the coevolution of helping and sex ratio (9, 10). 116
To highlight differences between these earlier ideas and ours (while noting they are not 117 mutually exclusive), we focus here on a setting that differs crucially from those considered in 118 earlier work. In collective defence against predators by haplodiploid larval groups, mate 119 availability is irrelevant (at this life-history stage), offspring do not interact with their mothers, 120 and sex ratio biases arise easily because unfertilized eggs develop into males. Virgin females 121 can thus produce sons, and mated females can adjust the sex ratio among their progeny by 122 laying a certain proportion of unfertilized eggs. 123
Finally, we explore experimentally the effect of sex-ratio and kin-structure on the contribution 124 to a collective act in larval groups of the haplodiploid pine sawfly Diprion pini. Similar to other 125 gregariously living pine sawfly larvae, D. pini feed in dense groups during the larval stage (11). 126
When threatened by natural enemies, larvae defend by regurgitating a resinous droplet of 127 fluid from their mouth and perform a defensive display in concert (12). The sticky physical 128 barrier produced by a group of defending pine sawfly larvae makes them unprofitable as prey 129 for both avian and arthropod predators, as it is difficult for a predator to catch an individualwithout smearing its feathers or cuticle with the resinous fluid (12-14). Larval survival is 131 consequently higher in groups than for solitary individuals (11, 15, 16 
Results
146
Model results
147
Sex ratio effect: Few males lead to females contributing relatively more 148 When larvae feed in kin groups, the primary sex ratio is a major determinant of the predicted 149 sex-specific contribution to group defence (Fig. 2) . If the proportion of males remains low, 150 females contribute relatively more to group defence than males (and vice versa), but the 151 magnitude of this effect is not identical across all low sex ratio situations. Collective action 152 contributions are particularly female-biased (visible in Fig. 2 being reddest at the bottom right 153 edge of the surface) when the rarity of males results from a low proportion of unmated 154 females (low p0; unmated females produce sons only). The contribution bias remains milder 155 when some females produce son-only broods while others specialize in producing females 156 (higher p0, r < 0.5), i.e. conditions in which some broods lack females and males then need tothe response in a logical direction (more male contributions if male reproductive success is 161 not strongly hampered by defensive behaviour in the larval stage and similarly for females; 162 compare columns in Fig. 2) . 163 164 Dominance and multiple mating increase female investment in group defence 165
Under haplodiploidy, males are bound to express their defence alleles, while in females, 166 defence alleles may be impacted by dominance. This turns out to only have a strong effect in 167 mixed groups when costs of defending do not differ between the sexes (Fig. S1, middle  168 column), or alternatively when we assume unresolved sexual conflict by making sex-specific 169 expression constrained such that there is only one shared locus for defense behavior for males 170 and females (with dominance assumptions impacting female but not male behavior ( Fig. S2-171 S3). Where dominance has an effect, it makes females contribute relatively more. 172
In kin groups, multiple mating has a much clearer effect than dominance. It weakens female 173 relatedness with no effect on males (as they are fatherless), and the consequence is in the 174 expected direction: the relative contribution by females decreases (making the top two rows 175 in Fig. 2 much more 'blue' overall when multiple mating is assumed). As expected, this effect 176 is not driven by an increase in absolute male contribution, but rather stems from a decreased (Fig. S5 , sex biases require a large enough ; the sex bias first appears at 189 low sex ratios, as in our main results, and with a high enough spread to all sex ratios). 190
191
Experimental Results
192
We estimated the influence of larval group structure (kin vs. mixed groups), sex ratio as well 193 as the absolute number of males and females on plasticity in defensive behavior by fitting a 194 set of candidate models to the experimental data (response variable: proportion of individuals 195 in a group that display defensive behavior when experimentally attacked) and estimating their 196 support based on Akaike information criteria (AIC). The 'attack' was performed by gently 197 squeezing a randomly chosen larva within a group with forceps. The best-performing model 198 included sex ratio and group structure (kin vs. mixed groups), and predicts that (i) the number 199 of individuals displaying defensive behavior decreases with the number of males, and (ii) 200 individuals in kin-groups contribute more to group defense than those in mixed groups (Table  201 1a, Fig. 3a&b ). 202
The above results (Table 1a) are based on data collected at a stage where the sex of the larvae 203 cannot be evaluated: larvae were only sexed after pupation, i.e. the experimenter was blind 204 to group sex ratios at the time of the experiment. This experiment therefore does not 205 comment on sex-specific investment directly, as it yields no direct measurements of the 206 proportion of male and female larvae that responded when a sister or a brother was attacked. 207
However, the group sex ratio was known afterwards, and both the best-performing and the 208 second-best model in terms of AIC (the 2 nd has roughly equal support ∆AIC=0.07 as the first) 209 include a sex ratio effect: the best model predicts that the proportion of defenders increases 210 at female-biased sex ratios, the 2 nd model yields the same outcome by specifically including 211 the number of females (instead of sex ratio), as well as group structure, as predictors of the 212 proportion that defend. The third model with good support includes group structure with no 213 other predictor (∆AIC=0.82). Two other candidate models are within the range of two AIC 214 points. Both include the number of males (which reduce contributions to defense) and group 215 though unsexed at the time, were responsible for producing the majority of defense, and that 218 larvae defended more if surrounded by kin (Table 1a , Fig. 3a&b ). 219
We also performed an experiment (Table 1b) where larvae of the last instar were attacked 220 individually, recording whether they deployed the defensive fluid. Since the larvae were kept 221 individually after this experiment, the sex could be assigned retrospectively once the larvae 222 pupated (20). All models with at least moderate support (within ΔAIC < 2) include the sex ratio 223 of the group that the larva came from as a predictor (Table 1b , Fig. 3 c&d) , with males 224 defending relatively more in male-biased experimental groups and females in female-biased 225 ones. The differences between the three well-supported models relate to whether own sex, 226 group structure, or neither is included in addition to group sex ratio (Table 1 ). In models where 227 they are, being female increases defence probability, similarly for being in a kin group. 228
Discussion
229
We find mathematical and experimental support for our hypothesis that when groups consist 230 of demographically distinct roles (different sexes in this case), that are not represented equally 231 in the population, the majority has a tendency to evolve to contribute more to the collective 232 good. The minority is more prone to freeride, as its failure to contribute to the collective good 233 does not have as severe consequences for the entire group than if the individuals forming the 234 majority did so. 235
Our toy model confirms this logic in the simplest possible setting, while our full model is based 236 on a real-life example involving haplodiploidy and a trait that is expressed long before 237 reproductive activities and the associated sex-specific behaviours begin. In the life cycle of the 238 full model, multiple other asymmetries than that of a 'minority sex' -'majority sex' may also 239 play a role. Specifically, female relatedness may vary as a result of multiple mating while that 240 of males does not. This can also modulate how much females contribute; less in case of 241 multiply mated mothers producing kin-grouped larvae than if the mother was singly mated. 242
Additionally, female (but not male) behaviour is impacted by a diploid genome, with the 243 potential for dominance to act on gene expression. However, this aspect of haplodiploidy is 244 not the main driver of our results: dominance only had a marked effect in model variants thatsexual conflict). In this case recessivity, rather obviously, reduces the probability that a female 247 expresses the trait, for any frequency of the trait in the population. 248
Our model also predicts group structure to play a role. The result that there is more defence 249 as a whole in kin-groups than in mixed groups is unsurprising. It is more intriguing that the 250 way sex ratio biases come about can have an impact on the sex-bias in behaviour. If male-only 251 broods increase in frequency (because some mothers reproduce as virgins), males contribute 252 more to defence than if a similar sex ratio is produced through primary sex ratio adjustments 253 among mated mothers. In the former case, male larvae are more likely to exist without any 254 sisters, and lack of defence would be very detrimental to such groups. 255
Many of these predictions are borne out by our experimental data from the haplodiploid D. 256 pini larvae. Individuals contributed more for the collective larval group defence in kin-groups 257 compared to mixed groups (in which individuals originated from different colonies), and 258 although an AIC analysis could not unambiguously differentiate between all variant models in 259 which own sex, group sex ratio and group structure (kin or mixed) were included or excluded, 260 the overall message remains clear: the more females in a group, the higher the proportion of 261 individuals contributing to defence. 262
Our mathematical model makes a number of key assumptions. Ours is an 'open model' (sensu 263 (21)) where some parameters, notably the probability that a female is unmated and the sex 264 ratio produced by the mated ones, are evaluated at every possible combination, rather than 265 restricting the view to those combinations that are more likely to be found in nature. In reality, 266 if many sons will be produced by virgin mothers, there will be selection on mated mothers to 267 specialize in the production of females, more so than they would in the absence of virgin 268 reproducers (22). Effectively, this means that the most likely areas of our surface plots found 269 in nature are those that do not feature unrealistically high proportions of males. We still prefer 270 to show the outcomes (male-biased contributions to the collective good) for those regions 271 too, as this helps to understand what conditions would be required for those to happen, and 272 strengthens the general message: the majority-minority asymmetry has the main effect that 273 we report, regardless of whether the majority consists of diploid or haploid individuals. 274 completely different loci controlling the same behavior in male and female larvae, allowing a 277 resolution of the conflict, or a single locus being expressed in both males and females (though 278 in a diploid state in the latter, in which case we investigated complete dominance and 279 recessivity as the two extremes). Here, our aim was to chart the extremes between which real 280 cases, with possibly polygenic expression of traits, are likely to lie. Completely independent 281 loci allow each sex to approach its own optimum in a manner that is dependent on what 282 siblings of a different sex do, unencumbered by genetic correlations between brother and 283 sister loci. The genetic architecture underlying defensive behaviour in D. pini is currently 284 unknown, but in general D. pini's likelihood to cheat in defence in larval stage (not produce 285 defensive secretion under attack) is a partly heritable trait both in females and males (18) . 286
In our model, the sex-ratio effects were stronger in kin-groups than in mixed groups. In 287 general, genetic relatedness promotes cooperation and increases contributions to collective 288 action. For examples, both theoretical and empirical research on the evolution of cooperative 289 breeding in haplodiploids suggest that cooperation is more likely to evolve under monogamy 290 than when broods are the result of polyandrous matings (23-26); in theoretical work that 291 specifically asks whether males or females should evolve into helpers, monogamous situations 292 under haplodiploidy can favour females as helpers (9, 27). Our results add a collective action 293 angle to these results: ours is not a model of cooperative breeding, as in our setting no 294 individual foregoes own reproduction to help others, instead the collective good is group 295 survival up to maturity. It also highlights a general principle about minority and majority roles; 296 while coexistence of cooperators and defectors is possible without such subdivision (1), our 297 results show that limits to the frequency of freeriders that arise from population subdivision 298 can help stabilize cooperation in the presence of cheaters. 299
Our new experimental results corroborate the findings of earlier research (18), suggesting that 300 D. pini females were more likely to contribute to group defence in kin-groups than males. In 301 our current study, we found evidence that the sex-ratio of the group modulated larval defence 302 behaviour. Although our study design made it difficult to disentangle whether female-biased 303 groups cooperated more simply because they had more females (that each contribute more) 304 or whether males too increase their effort in the presence of many sisters, our results raise 305 the possibility that D. pini larvae have some means to recognize their kin as well as the sex of 306 the other individuals in the group, adjusting their cooperative behaviour accordingly. Potentialmechanisms include CHP-compounds, already known to be important in nest-mate 308 recognition both in immature and mature life-stages in eusocial ant species (28, 29). In this 309 context, it is interesting to note that individuals were divided into the experimental groups as 310 smaller instars, and differences in their defensive behaviour were consistent until the last 311 larval instar. Cues to recognize kin therefore appear to be either innate or very strongly 312 impacted by very early natal environment (before we mixed the larvae). 313
Our experimental data was in one sense non-ideal for testing our results: natural sex-ratios in 314 sawflies that tend to be female biased (19), but some of our mothers, despite mating with a 315 male, only produced male offspring, i.e. we may have been testing our predictions under a 316 larger p0 value than is the naturally expected norm. Since we could not determine the sex of 317 the larvae until pupation, using all-male larval groups resulted in male-biased sex-ratios, which 318 impacted the sex ratios that were created for the mixed-group treatment. Despite the 319 generally low proportion of females in such groups, the outcomes were robustly in line with 320 our model predictions, which fortunately are directional (more females leads to more total 321 contributions to the collective good, whether the baseline sex ratio is low or high). 322
Our model considered contribution to collective antipredator defence in a specific setting, 323 group living haplodiploid larvae, but may open up interesting avenues for future research to 324 study effects of sex-linked differences in collective traits in general. Ours is not the only species 325 where females appear to contribute more to chemical defence: in burying beetles, females 326 can deploy higher quantities of the defensive secretion (30), while in other systems females 327 concentrate more toxins in their bodies (31), or transfer toxins for their offspring (32). Future 328 studies could usefully test the extent to which these reflect life history investment differences 329 that are selected for at the individual level, or are potentially shaped by selection to maintain 330 a collective good via educating the relevant predators. There are also interspecific settings 331 where rarity of one type is not related to abundances of the two sexes, but of two (or more) 332 species. As a concrete example, public goods games exist between species in aposematic 333 chemically defended insects that share the costs of predator education (predators learn to 334 associate warning coloration with the chemical defence of the prey and avoid attacking them 335
and any similar species in future). If defence is costly for an individual, some may 'cheat' byoffered by seasonality, see (33)). More generally still, the categories of individuals involved 339 may also be sexual and asexual forms of the same species, (34), or cell types in cancer, (35), 340 highlighting the general need to understand heterogeneity of individual contributions in the 341 light of the demography producing these individuals. 342
Methods (See SI for details) 343 
Model overview
344
We created individual-based simulations of a population of haplodiploids with non-overlapping generations.
345
Haplodiploidy often leads to biased sex ratios e.g. (9, 26, 36, 37), and we model the larval sex ratios as a result 346 of two processes: some females (proportion p0) remain unmated and produce only male offspring, while mated 347 females can produce a mix of male and female offspring; we model their sex ratio as r. We vary p0 from 0 to 1 348 and r from 0 to 0.5, but do not let them evolve, as our aim is to examine the consequences of biased larval sex 349 ratios on larval contributions to a common good, rather than examine the evolutionary reasons for sex ratio 350 biases per se.
351
We examine 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 different scenarios ( 
380
After mating, D. pini females were allowed to lay their eggs on randomly chosen Scots pine branches. After the 381 larvae hatched, they were fed with pine branches ad libitum, and fresh branches were provided twice a week.
382
Throughout the experiment, larvae were reared under constant temperature (20 ± 2 °C) in a laboratory room 383 which included both natural and electric light more or less constantly throughout the day. For the first 10 days 384 after hatching, larvae were reared in family groups. After that, larvae were randomly divided for the treatments.
385
In the experiment, we only used offspring of the females that were offered male to mate with and therefore 386 were likely to produce sexually produced families. However, 4 of the females reproduced asexually and laid only 387 haploid male eggs. Therefore, in non-kin groups, sex-ratios were male-biased (see below) and four of the kin-388 groups were all male-groups.
389
Experiment: Defensive behaviour in kin-and non-kin groups
390
To investigate if socially defending pine sawfly larvae are more likely to direct costly defensive acts to increase 391 survival of their kin, we tested how individuals contributed to the cooperative defensive behaviour when they 392 were reared in kin-groups (individuals originate from the same sexually produced clutch) or in non-kin groups.
393
To control the heritable variation in the chemical defence (18), same families were split across the kin-and non-394 kin treatments. We had two blocks of 5 families that had all hatched on the same day. This was to ensure that 395 larvae had similar size and developmental stage/instar (in case it somehow affects their cooperative behaviour).
396
In the first block, those same 5 families were used to form kin-groups (all the individuals originated from the 397 same family) and non-kin groups of 10 individuals (2 individuals per group originated from the same family).
398
Thus, altogether we had 10 families and 10 kin-groups and 10 non-kin groups. Larvae were divided into 399 treatments randomly. Since we cannot tell apart the sex of the individual in the early instars, we were not able 400 to control the sex-ratios within larval groups and among treatments.
401
Defensive behaviour of the larvae was measured 3 times during the experiment: the first time 2 days after the 402 experiment started, the second time after 7 days experiment started and last time when larvae were 21 days old 403 before the final dispersing instar. All the individuals within one block (5 kin-groups and 5 non-kin groups) were 404 measured on the same day. In the first two defensive behaviour assays (2 and 7 days), we measured the number 405 of defending individuals per group when one randomly chosen individuals from the group was 'attacked' 406 artificially by poking it 1-2 times on the dorsal side with the tip of the forceps. When larvae were 21-23 days old, we attacked the larvae individually by gently gripping them with the forceps and we measured the volume of the 408 defensive fluid they produced as well as the size of the individual (length). In these measurements, the defence 409 droplet was sucked into a 5μl capillary and its quantity was measured with an electronic ruler. We measured the 12.595) and below 100 mg as males (mean pupal mass for enclosed males 57.59 ± 9.368).
418
AIC Analysis
419
We estimated the influence of group structure (kin vs. mixed groups), sex ratio as well as the number of 420 males/females on defensive behavior by fitting a set of candidate models to the experimental data and 421 estimating their support based on Akaike information criteria (AIC) for both group and individual data. Each 422 candidate model specifies the predicted probability to contribute to the group defense based on a multinomial 423 logistic regression. Different models vary in the amount of parameter and the predictor variables. The tested 424 models range from a null model, where we assume the same predicted probabilities applies to everyone (Table   425 1a, Model A), to models where the group structure (Kin groups vs. mixed groups) as well as the sex ratio, either 426 as the relative proportion of males or the absolute number of males and females were included as predictors 427 (Table1a, Model H). The individual data allowed us to include the sex of the focal larvae (own sex) and thus the 428 most complicated model included sex ratio, group structure and the own sex (Table 1b .
433
The AIC scores were then calculated based on the best total log-likelihood within each model, while penalizing 434 models for including many parameters. 
530
Vectors depict Δx, Δy (see Supplementary material) but normalized to be of equal length for clarity.
531
Contributing is selected for (arrows point upwards and to the right) when it is only moderately present 532 in either population, but once contributing becomes common, the minority is selected to decrease its 543 increased male cost, = 1.5, = 1.2; equal cost, = 1.2, = 1.2; increased female cost, = 1.2, = 1.5.
544
Other assumptions: γ=3, kin-structured groups, and independent loci for male and female behavior. Vectors depict Δx, Δy (see Supplementary material) but normalized to be of equal length for clarity.
Contributing is selected for (arrows point upwards and to the right) when it is only moderately present in either population, but once contributing becomes common, the minority is selected to decrease its contributions and the system evolves to x = 1, y = 0 where all contributions are produced by the majority.
Figure 2
Mean male and female defensive behavior of 5 independent runs after 100 generations of simulation for varying r (x-axis) and p0 (y-axis) which together influence the sex ratio in the population (z-axis). The evolved relative contribution of females and males to the group defense is indicated by the coloration (female defense -male defense), with redder coloration indicating that females contribute more (per capita) and bluer coloration that males contribute more (per capita) to group defense. Female effort associates with female-biased sex ratios, male effort with male-biased sex ratios, but the borders between male-and female-biased effort are modulated by dominant vs.
recessive gene expression and multiple mating (if permitted, females contribute less). Parameters: increased male cost, = 1.5, = 1.2; equal cost, = 1.2, = 1.2; increased female cost, = 1.2, = 1.5.
Other assumptions: γ=3, kin-structured groups, and independent loci for male and female behavior. Table 1 The tested models with the respective AIC, (Akaike Information Criterion) scores. Models are listed in order of increasing AIC values (AIC, score differences AIC) for the group data (a) and individual data (b). Green shading shows models within 2 AIC points of the best model.
Supplementary information 1 2
Toy model of a collective good with two categories of players 3 Consider two large populations that are reproductively isolated but interact in the sense that, 4 prior to reproduction, both populations contribute members to groups that participate in a 5 common goods game. Population M (the majority) always contributes 3 members, population m 6 (the minority) always contributes 2 members, such that the groups consist of 5 members in total. 7 M-individuals contribute towards the common good with probability x or freeride (fail to 8 contribute) with probability 1-x; for m-individuals the corresponding probabilities are y and 1-y. 9
We assume that if the group has more contributing individuals than freeriders, it will survive. The 10 overall probability that a group survives is given by 11 P (3 M-contributors, regardless of m-individuals' behavior) 12 + P (2 M-contributors and 1 m-contributor) 13 + P (1 M-contributor and 2 m-contributors) 14
To evaluate evolutionary changes, we need to derive the fitness of contributing and non-16 contributing M-and m-individuals in a population where current contribution probabilities are x 17 and y. We assume that if the group survives, the freeriders (who all survive) enjoy fitness α > 1, 18 while surviving contributors have fitness 1. This reflects the costs of contributing in a common 19 good game. 20
Fitness of a non-contributing M-individual ( M0 ) 21
Fitness is α for survived non-contributors, and survival depends probabilistically on the actions 22 of other group members: survival occurs with probability 23 P(the other two M-members of the group contribute and at least 1 of the m-members does so] 24 + P(one of the other two M-members contribute and 2 m-members do). 25 
Fitness of a non-contributing M-individual ( m0 ) 36
Fitness is α for survived non-contributors, and survival occurs with probability 37 P(all three W-individuals contribute) 38 + P (two of the W-individuals contribute, and the other w-individual does so too) 39 We initialised the population by creating N diploid individuals with either two loci for defence, 63 one expressed in males and one in females, or just one shared locus (expressed in both sexes). 64
We randomly assigned either 1 or 0 for each of the four or two potential alleles (2 for female and 65 2 for male larval defence if the latter are modelled separately). Thereafter, we convert (initially) 66
half of the population into haploid males by retaining only the first of the two copies of the locus. 67
To give maximal flexibility for the evolutionary process to find female and male optima without 68 genetic constraints in the two-locus case, these loci are unlinked. 69
We begin the simulation with the adult generation (see below), however since the phenotype of 70 each individual can be deduced from their genotypes, we assume these adults already have a 71 larval past during which they were defenders or freeriders. 72
Life history events 73
Mating & reproduction 74
Adult individuals form one mating pool, and we first compute male and female competitiveness. 75
When competing to be parents of the next generation, individuals that have been freeriders as 76 larvae get a competitive advantage of (for males) or (for females). Since the competitive 77 advantage is based on the phenotype, in the recessive scenario females only defend (and pay the
